The chain-store paradox revisited

DOI10.1007/BF00127193zbMath0604.90150MaRDI QIDQ1084033

Walter Trockel

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

complete but imperfect informationpredation against early entrants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (3)

The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory ⋮ Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story ⋮ REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING

Cites Work

• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Agreeing to disagree
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
• Note on von Neumann-Morgenstern's Strong Independence Axiom
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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