Predictive superiority of the beta-characteristic function in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games

DOI10.1007/BF00127190zbMath0605.90142OpenAlexW1988838744MaRDI QIDQ1084346

H. Andrew Michener, David C. Dettman, James M. Ekman

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00127190

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoredecision-makingexperimental studycooperative non-sidepayment gamesimputation setpayoff predictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical psychology (91E99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

• A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games¹
• The Core of an N Person Game
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