One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions

DOI10.1007/BF00134096zbMath0606.90007OpenAlexW1983834610MaRDI QIDQ1085020

Robert F. Bordley

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134096

zbMATH Keywords

weighted votingefficient voting systemone person/one vote

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

Related Items (2)

Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Condorcet meets Bentham

Cites Work

• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• Aggregating subjective probabilities: Some limitative theorems
• Consensus of opinion
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
• Combining Probability Distributions from Dependent Information Sources
• The Combination of Forecasts: A Bayesian Approach
• A Multiplicative Formula for Aggregating Probability Assessments
• A Bayesian Approach to the Linear Combination of Forecasts
• Decision Analysis Expert Use
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Combining Expert Judgments: A Bayesian Approach
• Reaching a Consensus
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A Note on the Complete Independence of the Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions