The capacity of a committee

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90033-8zbMath0606.90010OpenAlexW1987728140MaRDI QIDQ1085023

Ron Holzman

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90033-8

zbMATH Keywords

strong representationstrategy-proofnesssimple gamehomogeneity assumptioncapacity of a committee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

On strong representations of games by social choice functions ⋮ Cores and capacities of compound simple games ⋮ Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments ⋮ On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games

Cites Work

• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
• The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

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