Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1zbMath0606.90019OpenAlexW2162070285MaRDI QIDQ1085032

Dilip Abreu, Ennio Stacchetti, David G. Pearce

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4632.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

family of static gamesoptimal symmetric equilibriareduction of the repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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