The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90020-7zbMath0606.90149OpenAlexW2045528147MaRDI QIDQ1085080

John O. Ledyard

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81585/

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumBayes equilibrium behaviortransformed game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (13)

The subjective expected utility hypothesis and revealed preference ⋮ The aggregated excess demand function and other aggregation procedures ⋮ Identification of payoffs in repeated games ⋮ The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms ⋮ Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules ⋮ Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard ⋮ Comment on ``Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordination games ⋮ Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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