Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90101-3zbMath0609.90013OpenAlexW2055426656MaRDI QIDQ1087119

Patrick Legros

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90101-3

zbMATH Keywords

Aumann's paradoxbilateral marketstrong stability of a syndicatetwo complementary commodities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies ⋮ Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Bargaining: Separately or together? ⋮ The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games ⋮ Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets ⋮ Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

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