The Minmax Theorem for U.S.C.-L.S.C. payoff functions

DOI10.1007/BF01769388zbMath0611.90105MaRDI QIDQ1087479

Jean-Francois Mertens

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

\(\epsilon \)-optimal strategiesgeneral minimax theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (5)

Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections ⋮ SIMPLE EQUILIBRIA IN SEMI-INFINITE GAMES ⋮ On repeated games without a recursive structure: Existence of \(\lim v_ n\) ⋮ Weak stackelberg problem and mixed solutions under data perturbations¹¹this paper is based upon a communication presented at the 14th symposium on mathematical programming with data perturbation, Washington D.C. 1992. This research has been supported by M.U.R.S.T Roma, Italia.$ef: ⋮ Distributive politics and electoral competition

Cites Work

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• Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-39), Volume III
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• Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52)
• Criteres de Compacite dans les Espaces Fonctionnels Generaux
• Sur Les Applications Lineaires Faiblement Compactes D'Espaces Du Type C(K)

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