Power indices for multicandidate voting games

DOI10.1007/BF01769257zbMath0611.90106OpenAlexW2095516547MaRDI QIDQ1087481

Edward M. Bolger

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769257

zbMATH Keywords

power indexsimple gamemulti-candidate voting gamessupporting coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (19)

The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ A set of axioms for a value for partition function games ⋮ On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies ⋮ Limit Property of a Multi-Choice Value and the Fuzzy Value ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention ⋮ Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval ⋮ The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives ⋮ A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives ⋮ The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities ⋮ Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Cites Work

• Values of games in partition function form
• The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
• N‐person games in partition function form

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