Power and public goods

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90105-0zbMath0617.90003OpenAlexW2106326335MaRDI QIDQ1088866

Abraham Neyman, Robert John Aumann, Mordecai Kurz

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90105-0

zbMATH Keywords

democracypublic goodsHarsanyi-Shapley nontransferable utility value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core ⋮ Why do some good bear higher taxes than others?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The Shapley value in the non differentiable case
• Values of games with a continuum of prayers
• Voting for Public Goods
• Measure-Based Values of Market Games
• Values and Derivatives
• The Partition Value
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Power and Taxes