A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game

DOI10.1007/BF00134100zbMath0617.90093OpenAlexW2019482374MaRDI QIDQ1088920

R. Harrison Wagner

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134100

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectationsBishop-Foldes bargaining solutionnoncooperative games in extensive formsequential bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Sequential Equilibria

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