Structural instability of the core

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(86)90009-1zbMath0617.90099OpenAlexW2028483727MaRDI QIDQ1088925

Norman Schofield, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-145130668

zbMATH Keywords

coreWhitney topologysymmetry conditionsstructural instabilityinstability dimensionq-rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games ⋮ The dynamics of issue introduction: A model based on the politics of ideology ⋮ Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model ⋮ Smooth social choice ⋮ Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining ⋮ Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences ⋮ Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty ⋮ Finessing a point: augmenting the core ⋮ The intellectual contribution of Condorcet to the founding of the US republic 1785-1800 ⋮ Growth rates in multidimensional spatial voting ⋮ FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE

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