Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
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Publication:1090212
DOI10.1007/BF00450993zbMath0619.90003OpenAlexW2112349859MaRDI QIDQ1090212
John A. Weymark, Aanund Hylland, Allan F. Gibbard
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00450993
Related Items
Correspondence between social choice functions and solutions of cooperative games, Social choice in economic environments, Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem, Social choice problems with fixed sets of alternatives, John A. Weymark, Uniformly bounded information and social choice, Nash social welfare orderings.
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