Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8zbMath0619.90090OpenAlexW2005516244WikidataQ56081769 ScholiaQ56081769MaRDI QIDQ1090261

Bezalel Peleg, B. Douglas Bernheim, Michael D. Whinston

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibria Nash best-response property self- enforceability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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