Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90100-1zbMath0619.90091OpenAlexW2032487681MaRDI QIDQ1090262

B. Douglas Bernheim, Michael D. Whinston

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90100-1

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriumCournot oligopolistscooperation in finite horizon gamesoligopolistic entry deterrencesocial choice rule implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts ⋮ On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium ⋮ Coalitions among computationally bounded agents ⋮ Cooperative concurrent games ⋮ Congestion games with failures ⋮ Which acceptable agreements are equilibria? ⋮ Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly. ⋮ Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems ⋮ Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games ⋮ A dynamic approach to cartel formation ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints ⋮ Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games ⋮ Coalition-proof implementation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

This page was built for publication: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications