Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames

DOI10.1007/BF01756243zbMath0621.90104OpenAlexW1979402698MaRDI QIDQ1090635

Jonathan A. K. Cave

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01756243

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriumsupergame

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games ⋮ The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor ⋮ On the size and structure of group cooperation ⋮ The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.

Cites Work

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