A group majority voting model of public good provision

DOI10.1007/BF00450994zbMath0622.90008OpenAlexW2041128281MaRDI QIDQ1091237

Rebecca B. Morton

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00450994

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulepublic good provisionasymmetric equilibriarational group voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution ⋮ Voting

Cites Work

• Existence of voting-market equilibria
• Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
• A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule

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