Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
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Publication:1091239
DOI10.1007/BF00649266zbMath0622.90010MaRDI QIDQ1091239
Thomas R. Palfrey, Peter J. Coughlin
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution ⋮ Policies over time and Pareto optimality ⋮ A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences ⋮ Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty
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