Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees

DOI10.1007/BF00450995zbMath0622.90096MaRDI QIDQ1091285

Farid Gasmi, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumpolitical science3-person voting gameagenda-formation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (3)

Endogenous voting agendas ⋮ Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly ⋮ Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy

Cites Work

• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Unnamed Item

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