The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90005-XzbMath0627.90001OpenAlexW2024851821WikidataQ127942860 ScholiaQ127942860MaRDI QIDQ1092773

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90005-x

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelexistence of optimal contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (18)

Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard ⋮ Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection ⋮ On the continuity of expected utility ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Wealth effects in the principal agent model ⋮ Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems ⋮ Ranking of signals in multitask agency models ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information ⋮ Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems ⋮ Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard

Cites Work

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• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• A sufficient condition for continuity of optimal sets in mathematical programming
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• On pointwise convergence, compactness and equicontinuity in the lifting topology. I
• Preservation of Weak Convergence Under Mapping

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