Support restrictions and sequential equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90063-9zbMath0627.90102OpenAlexW1972553850MaRDI QIDQ1092829

Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, Vicente Madrigal, Tommy Chin-Chiu Tan

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90063-9

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesinformation setsequential equilibriasupport of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (max. 100)

Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights ⋮ Information collection in bargaining ⋮ Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough ⋮ Multiagent negotiation under time constraints

Cites Work

• Reputation and imperfect information
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences

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