A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games

DOI10.1007/BF00126304zbMath0628.90102MaRDI QIDQ1093579

David C. Dettman, David C. Julseth, H. Andrew Michener, Greg D. Richardson

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuenucleoluslaboratory experimentHarsanyi threat functionmixed strategy characteristic functionprediction of payoffspure strategy characteristic functionsidepayment games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets

Cites Work

• Mollifiers for games in normal form and the Harsanyi-Selten valuation function
• On the comparative accuracy of lexicographical solutions in cooperative games
• Constrained \(n\)-person games
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games