Epistemic theories and the interpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems
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Publication:1094407
zbMath0631.03009MaRDI QIDQ1094407
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30)
Related Items (9)
Representing the knowledge of Turing machines ⋮ Provability in principle and controversial constructivistic principles ⋮ The paradox of the knower revisited ⋮ DISJUNCTION AND EXISTENCE PROPERTIES IN MODAL ARITHMETIC ⋮ Some limitations to the psychological orientation in semantic theory ⋮ Short-circuiting the definition of mathematical knowledge for an artificial general intelligence ⋮ The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic ⋮ Non-deterministic logic of informal provability has no finite characterization ⋮ Knowledge, machines, and the consistency of Reinhardt's strong mechanistic thesis
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