On weighted Shapley values
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1096554
DOI10.1007/BF01756292zbMath0633.90100MaRDI QIDQ1096554
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations, WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE, A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions, WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES, How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach, On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values, Indices of Criticality in Simple Games, Scarcity, competition, and value, On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index, Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning, Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally, Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value, A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure, Preservation of risk in capital markets, The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values, Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value, The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value, Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value, Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values, Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river, Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions, Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law, Stable governments and the semistrict core, Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games, Multiple stage optimization driven group decision making method with interval linguistic fuzzy preference relations based on ordinal consistency and DEA cross-efficiency, Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values, New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value, Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations, A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims, Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents, Partnership formation and multinomial values, AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM, An axiomatization of success, Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players, ``Optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems, The optimistic \(TU\) game in minimum cost spanning tree problems, Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games, Axiomatizations of the Owen value without efficiency, Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms, Unnamed Item, Weighted Shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form, Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions, Interaction indices for games on combinatorial structures with forbidden coalitions, Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices, Unnamed Item, The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure, A Theory of Status-Mediated Inequity Aversion, A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES, Associated games to optimize the core of a transferable utility game, Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games, Cooperative Game as Non-Additive Measure, Copula-opinion pooling with complex opinions, SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES, A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance, How to share when context matters: the Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games, Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?, The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes, The proportional partitional Shapley value, Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value, On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games, Two Optimal Allocations under Management Systems: Game-theoretical Approaches, On a class of solidarity values, On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games, Characterizations of weighted and equal division values, A new basis and the Shapley value, Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values, A precedence constraint value revisited, Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions, On weighted Kalai--Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games, Measuring and rewarding flexibility in collaborative distribution, including two-partner coalitions, Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution, Games and cooperation indices, The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure, Automorphisms and weighted values, A new weight scheme for the Shapley value, Weighted Banzhaf values, Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions, The proportional Shapley value and applications, Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure, Effectivity and power, The effects of excluding coalitions, Axiomatic characterizations of generalized values, Harsanyi support levels solutions, Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions, Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value, Cooperative games with hedonic coalitions, Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games, Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory, Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques, Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games, Solidarity in games with a coalition structure, Weighted values and the core in NTU games, The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures, Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies, The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure, Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities, Semivalues as power indices., Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value, ``Procedural values for cooperative games, The limit-price mechanism., Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation, Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games, Values with exogenous payments, Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation, A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation, Games with nested constraints given by a level structure, Graph monotonic values, Axiomatic characterizations of the weighted solidarity values, Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set, Potential maximizers and network formation, A novel intensive distribution logistics network design and profit allocation problem considering sharing economy, A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems, Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue, A matrix approach to TU games with coalition and communication structures, Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games, Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values, Random order coalition structure values, On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values, Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game, Pyramidal values, Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties, Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value, Filtrations, values and voting discipline, A new axiomatization of the Shapley value, The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes, A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities, Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure, The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value, Weighted values and the core, Weighted coalition structure values, Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility, Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games, Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining, A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value, The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions, Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value, A characterization of kruskal sharing rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems, Values for Markovian coalition processes, Values and coalition configurations, On coalitional semivalues, The selectope for bicooperative games, Pricing traffic in a spanning network, Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution, Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation, The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure, Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values, A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data, Random marginal and random removal values, Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index, Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures, On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value, On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values, Partnership formation and binomial semivalues, The space of conditional systems is a ball, An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes, A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems, Potential, value, and coalition formation, Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value, Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities, Solutions for non-negatively weighted TU games derived from extension operators, Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games, An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value, On the convenience to form coalitions or partnerships in simple games
Cites Work
