On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00286869zbMath0634.90100OpenAlexW1986315851MaRDI QIDQ1097181

Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00286869

zbMATH Keywords

voting gameslocal corechoice of the topology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Structural instability of the core
• Smooth preferences and the regularity of equilibria
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Functions with a Proper Local Maximum in Each Interval
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Continuous Functions with a Dense Set of Proper Local Maxima
• Saturation Locale et Concepts Primitifs de la Theorie du Consommateur
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Regular, Nonconvex Economies
• On the Continuous Representation of Preorders
• Smooth Preferences

This page was built for publication: On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games