Strategic voting in repeated referenda

DOI10.1007/BF00435497zbMath0635.90007MaRDI QIDQ1097821

B. George

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learningvotingsequential gamebudget maximizing bureaucratcontinuum of heterogeneous votersdominant bureaucratperfect Bayes Nashreferendum approval

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

VOTE-BUYING AND GROWTH

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Optimal Auction Design
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information

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