Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90100-7zbMath0635.90008OpenAlexW2087200066MaRDI QIDQ1097823

David E. M. Sappington, Joel S. Demski, Pablo T. Spiller

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90100-7

zbMATH Keywords

incentive schemesbankruptcy constraintsrisk-neutral agentssubgame equilibriumtruth-telling Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem