On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90115-3zbMath0635.90103OpenAlexW2023017354MaRDI QIDQ1097842

Wolfgang Leininger, Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90115-3

zbMATH Keywords

measurable functionsperfect informationexistence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategiesfinitely or countably many playersinfinite-action games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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