On the core of voting games
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Publication:1098787
DOI10.1007/BF00286870zbMath0636.90099OpenAlexW2097020790MaRDI QIDQ1098787
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00286870
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- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
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