Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1099061
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90015-2zbMath0637.90023OpenAlexW1982617123MaRDI QIDQ1099061
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90015-2
convergence to rational expectationsagents' forecastsprobability distribution of equilibrium outcomes
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