Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism

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Publication:1099096

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(87)90024-8zbMath0637.90109OpenAlexW2089605141MaRDI QIDQ1099096

Matti Pohjola, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(87)90024-8




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