On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90019-9zbMath0639.90009OpenAlexW1992827542WikidataQ57927180 ScholiaQ57927180MaRDI QIDQ1100072

David Kelsey, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90019-9

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet paradoxP-matrixvoting paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

Division of power in legislatures with two cohesive subgroups ⋮ On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox ⋮ Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox ⋮ The Ostrogorski paradox ⋮ Compromise in combinatorial vote ⋮ Multi-dimensional rules ⋮ Only a dictatorship is efficient ⋮ Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum ⋮ Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule ⋮ Representation in majority tournaments ⋮ The budget-voting paradox ⋮ Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox ⋮ Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models ⋮ Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?

Cites Work

• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
• Anscombe's paradox and the rule of three-fourths
• The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto

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