Demons and repentance

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90252-9zbMath0639.90105OpenAlexW2077937741MaRDI QIDQ1100103

Paul S. Segerstrom

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90252-9

zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated Cournot duopoly gamesstability of cartelssubgame perfect equilibrium strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model ⋮ Cooperation in dynamic games with asymmetric players: the role of social preferences ⋮ Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games ⋮ On the feasibility of maximal collusion ⋮ THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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