Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation

DOI10.1007/BF01756025zbMath0641.90010MaRDI QIDQ1100984

Ron Holzman

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coresocial choice correspondencesnucleus of an effectivity functionstrong equilibrium correspondencestrong implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization ⋮ Vetoing in social choice with blockings ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

Cites Work

• The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Proportional Veto Principle

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