Strong equilibria of a repeated game with randomized strategies

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90001-1zbMath0641.90097OpenAlexW2129067307MaRDI QIDQ1101022

Tatsuro Ichiishi

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90001-1

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamecompact metric spacenonemptinessrandomized strategiesone-shot game\(\beta \)- corecorrelated strategiesstrong equilibrium utility allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Core-like solutions for games with probabilistic choice of strategies

Cites Work

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• Refinements of the \(\beta\)-core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Cores in noncooperative games
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom

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