Social choice and computational complexity

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(88)90022-5zbMath0642.90005OpenAlexW2019635179WikidataQ128116465 ScholiaQ128116465MaRDI QIDQ1101310

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(88)90022-5

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycomputable rulessimple majority votinguncomputable rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

On the difficulty of making social choices ⋮ Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators ⋮ Computability and randomness of Nash equilibrium in infinite games ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Cites Work

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• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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