A new approach to the implementation problem
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Publication:1101317
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90257-8zbMath0642.90011OpenAlexW2050194330MaRDI QIDQ1101317
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90257-8
Related Items
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria, Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support, Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules, Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide, Credible implementation, Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types, Virtual repeated implementation, Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation, Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences, One-step-ahead implementation, Approximate implementation in Markovian environments, Nash implementation via hyperfunctions, Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition, Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization, Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty, Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation, Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations, A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium, Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions, Implementation Theory, The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model, Nash implementation without no-veto power, Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions, A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation, Smooth multibidding mechanisms, A solution to the two-person implementation problem, Implementation with evidence, An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo, Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals, Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability, Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets, Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy, Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments, Time and Nash implementation, Contingent commodities and implementation
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