A non-dictatorial compromise

DOI10.1007/BF00435495zbMath0643.90004MaRDI QIDQ1102157

Murat R. Sertel

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

axiomsmodeapproval votingaggregation of choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Explorations in aggregating choices ⋮ Characterizing approval voting ⋮ Manipulability of choice aggregations ⋮ Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting

Cites Work

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• On the routewise application of choice
• Computations in choice groupoids
• Comparison and choice
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Synopses in the Theory of Choice
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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