The manipulability of the Shapley-value

DOI10.1007/BF01254542zbMath0646.90102WikidataQ59973033 ScholiaQ59973033MaRDI QIDQ1104257

William Thomson

Publication date: 1988

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuefair divisionPareto-efficiencymanipulation quasi-gamemisrepresentationWalrasian manipulation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (16)

Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ A new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ The consistent Shapley value in hyperplane games from a global standpoint ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies ⋮ Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value ⋮ Nash bargaining and risk aversion ⋮ About inheritance distribution. ⋮ Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization ⋮ On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.

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