Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1104838
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3zbMath0647.90013OpenAlexW2135106589MaRDI QIDQ1104838
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3
stabilitycoalition formationlocal public goodsgroup formationlarge economiesjurisdictionscollective consumptionstable partition of individuals
Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (16)
Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core ⋮ A Tiebout theorem ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Club theory and household formation ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Power at general equilibrium ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics ⋮ Clubs and the market: Large finite economies ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores ⋮ Household formation and markets
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
- Human environment as a local public good
- Efficient Exchange with a Variable Number of Consumers
- The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- The Core of an N Person Game
This page was built for publication: Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
