Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox

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Publication:1106064

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0zbMath0649.90010OpenAlexW2160005047WikidataQ56457253 ScholiaQ56457253MaRDI QIDQ1106064

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0




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