Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
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Publication:1106064
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0zbMath0649.90010OpenAlexW2160005047WikidataQ56457253 ScholiaQ56457253MaRDI QIDQ1106064
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0
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Cites Work
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- Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism
- Choosing from a tournament
- To vote or not to vote: What is the quota?
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Stability and Collective Rationality
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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