Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
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Publication:1106074
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90151-2zbMath0649.90027OpenAlexW2060126481MaRDI QIDQ1106074
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90151-2
Bayesian Nash equilibriumoptimal auctionasymmetric stage gamerepeated auction settingrepeated game of incomplete informationsecond-price, common-value auctionssymmetric stage gametwo bidders
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (13)
Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format ⋮ Equilibria in open common value auctions ⋮ Bidding in a possibly common-value auction ⋮ Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions ⋮ Hybrid auctions revisited ⋮ Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions ⋮ Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty ⋮ On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions ⋮ A learning approach to auctions ⋮ Coordination in auctions with entry ⋮ Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games ⋮ Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Communications to the Editor—Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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