Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90147-0zbMath0649.90028OpenAlexW2058097231MaRDI QIDQ1106076

Winand Emons

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90147-0

zbMATH Keywords

competitive marketdouble-sided moral hazardproduct failurewarranties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (6)

Efficient regulated entry in competitive markets with demand uncertainty ⋮ Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance ⋮ Quality as a substitute for quantity. Do more reliable products ever sell for less! ⋮ Product warranty management. III: A review of mathematical models ⋮ Advances in Bayesian decision making in reliability ⋮ Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers' extended warranties

Cites Work

• Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets
• Monopoly and product quality
• Sequential Equilibria
• Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability

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