The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
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Publication:1106109
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90049-7zbMath0649.90103OpenAlexW2082937924MaRDI QIDQ1106109
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90049-7
Nash equilibriumprisoner's dilemmabattle of the sexesobservation structurevon Neumann-Morgenstern stable setcontinuum of playersconventionally stable response configurationdilemma game with a monitoring machine rumorfestival gamen-person non-cooperative gamesrepetition of a game
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On the existence of a stable convention and a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium ⋮ Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Information leakage forces cooperation ⋮ Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers
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