The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games
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Publication:1106110
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90274-8zbMath0649.90105OpenAlexW1979592899MaRDI QIDQ1106110
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90274-8
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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