Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees

DOI10.1007/BF00433655zbMath0651.90003OpenAlexW2059907161MaRDI QIDQ1106706

Bezalel Peleg, Claude d'Aspremont

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433655

zbMATH Keywords

existencestrategic manipulationOrdinally Bayesian incentive compatible representationweak games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Representation of constitutions under incomplete information ⋮ Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets ⋮ Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets ⋮ Random matching in the college admissions problem ⋮ Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Incentives in decentralized random matching markets ⋮ Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs ⋮ Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules

Cites Work

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• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk

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