Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
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Publication:1106743
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90150-0zbMath0651.90095OpenAlexW2021785901MaRDI QIDQ1106743
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90150-0
bargainingcomparative statics resultscompeting-group generatorentry problem in assignment gamesimmigrations
Related Items (17)
Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets ⋮ Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility ⋮ Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game ⋮ Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Vacancies in supply chain networks ⋮ Comparative cooperative game theory ⋮ Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market ⋮ Complements and substitutes in generalized multisided assignment economies ⋮ Monotonicity of solutions in certain dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Restabilizing matching markets at senior level ⋮ Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems ⋮ Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Coalition Structure in a Labor-Managed Market Economy
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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