Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90045-4zbMath0651.90101OpenAlexW1963838321WikidataQ114684125 ScholiaQ114684125MaRDI QIDQ1106751

Jeffrey H. Weiss, Norman L. Kleinberg

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90045-4

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecoremonotonicity axiomlinear symmetric valuesprojection axiomstrategic risk neutrality axiomsuper-additive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values ⋮ On membership and marginal values ⋮ Network games and solutions from decomposition techniques ⋮ New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions ⋮ Representation theory of the symmetric group in voting theory and game theory ⋮ A decomposition for the space of games with externalities ⋮ A New Look at the Study of Solutions for Games in Partition Function Form ⋮ A note on the Sobolev consistency of linear symmetric values

Cites Work

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• Competitive and value allocations of large exchange economies
• The representation theory of the symmetric groups
• Equivalent N-Person Games and the Null Space of the Shapley Value
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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