Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1107402
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8zbMath0652.90013OpenAlexW1983254396MaRDI QIDQ1107402
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8
tournamentaxiomatic characterizationcovering setuncovered setCondorcet choice correspondencenew solution concept
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Cites Work
