On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions

DOI10.1007/BF00133162zbMath0653.90006MaRDI QIDQ1108169

Edi Karni

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

descending bid auctionsexpected utility maximizing behaviorfirst price sealed bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (7)

Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders ⋮ A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Information acquisition during a descending auction ⋮ Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders ⋮ Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk

Cites Work

• Ascending bid auctions with behaviorally consistent bidders
• Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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